every nasty person-from Mussolini and his henchmen to ill-tempered policemen and professors who expect their students to complete assignments. No wonder that anyone using the term to analyze politics in the Third World is immediately suspected of being in the pay of the Israelis-or worse. (The present author can state categorically that he is in the pay of no government, Alas!) Nevertheless, many political scientists have concluded that fascism models are useful for coming to grips with the tumultuous politics of the underdeveloped world. This article explores some of the reasons for and implications of that conclusion.
It is necessary to explain what is meant by fascism, but also avoid asphyxiating the reader by one of those Saharan disquisitions on ideological nuance so dear to the academic heart. Fascists I define as those who, like the rulers of Italy after 1922, approach political life with certain, fundamental ideas. First, politics is preeminently a dangerous competition among nations; the strong may survive, the weak will be subjugated. Second, and consequently, the productive power of one's country must be raised to the utmost; in this struggle for production (and suryival) there is room for neither capitalist egoism nor Marxist class struggle, but only for class collaboration under state supervision. (Loosely, this is fascist "corporatism," seen as a middle way between the individualist Scylla and the collectivist Charybdis.) Third, ensuring these goals in a perilous world requires not constitutional restraints, parliamentary palaver, or partisan divisions, but unlimited authority wielded by a sagacious and acknowledged Clite: "Nothing above the State, nothing against the State."
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"racial" campaigns of the Nazis. It is basic beliefs that make fascism what it is. Similarly, such diverse societies as Costa Rica, Finland, and. the United States are "democratic," while Mao's China, Tito's Yugoslavia. Castro's Cuba, and Stalin's Russia, however contrasting their policies and styles, are generally described as "Communist ."
Fascism in a non-European context is not new: One recalls Peronist Argentina and prewar Japan. What is new is that Third World fascism is no longer an isolated oddity, but nearly a commonplace.
There are many more independent countries,.most of them in bad shape, than even a scant twenty years ago. Everywhere the bright expectations of preindependence days have been profoundly disappointed. Independence was going to usher in the millennium; severe problems in education, transportation, agriculture, and ethnic relations were going to be attacked simultaneously and solved speedily. A running start would be made on catching up with the industrialized world.
Instead political institutions (modeled on those of the imperial power) did not work; economic development did not take place. Patriotism, progress, and justice dissolved into tribalism, civil war, and repression. Out of a maelstrom of frustration, corruption, and violence has emerged the archetypal institution of the Third World, from Indonesia to Ghana to Peru: the dictatorship. Whether of the single party or the militayvariety, whether from conviction or necessity, they enunciate ideas characteristic of this century: The nation, united under enlightened leaders, must build its strength to vindicate its claims in an unjust world. These regimes have been called national populist, Kemalist, Nasserist, Nkrumahist, etc., etc.- These little problems arise quite apart from the support given Mussolini before and after the March on Rome by numerous veterans; landowners, working men, and so on, which perhaps renders any conspiracy theory superfluous. The Marxist explanation was, of course, a singlefactor account of a complex phenomenon. All politics is class struggle, all is explicable in terms of that struggle. But the inadequacy of such ideas had become apparent to the whole world in 1914. Vaunted international socialist solidarity crumbled like a rusted hammer and sickle as French and Belgian socialists and proletarians rushed to arms against German socialists and proletarians. This triumph of nation over class, this impossible occurrence, scandalized Lenin, shocked Mussolini, split world socialism, and produced the Bolshevik and Fascist revolutions. (Lenin, of course, had abandoned ideas of class determinism years before, when he founded his party of professional revolutionaries; but he was still appalled at the zest with which fraternal Marxists flew at one another. )
In its own self-image Italian fascism was a moderating movement, not a "rightist" one. Mussolini promised that "in ten years, you will not recognize this Italy." Such aspirations were largely realized; the foundations of the "economic miracle" of the 1950's were laid down between 1922 and 1938. Even Communist scholars, drawing away from the Stalinist standard version (where permitted). have declared that fascism's "historic mission" in Italy was to break age-old bottlenecks to industrialization.
Finally, if fascism is the extreme Right and communism the extreme Left, whatever is typically found in the one should be completely absent in the other. The second, more elemental, reason why we cannot bear to describe the powerful current sweeping across the Third World as fascism is this: We don't like Mussolini. Notbecause he was a tyrant; tyrants fascinate us, the bloodier the better, as the endless stream of scholarly and popular works about Hitler and Stalin attest. What we don't like is the image of the defeated Duce's corpse hanging upside down, dripping blood and spittle, mutilated by a howling rabble. Such total failure is in dreadful taste. Fascism was thoroughly defeated, hence thoroughly discredited. Popular biographies, therefore, treat extensively of Mussolini's amours, while scholars often display such a cavalier attitude toward the historical record that they would be branded incompetents in any other context. Fascism was silly, Mussolini was a clown. Mussolini is dead, fascism is dead, and that's that.
The dangerous, not to say grotesque, failure of understanding involved here is shown by the thundering contrast between our present attitudes toward the founder of fascism and that of his contemporaries. By his own admission Churchill would have taken Mussolini as an ally as late as 1942. Pius XI called Mussolini ''a man sent to us by God." Sigmund Freud addressed him as "the hero of culture." For Gandhi he was "the saviour of Italy and, I hope, of the world." And so it went. What seduced all manner of men once can do so again-and does.
11 of this aside, the point of this article is A that fascism is reappearing in the developing world. The following brief sketches-of Egypt, Ghana, and Brazil-will perhaps suggest the empirical base for such a position.
In 1952 the Egyptian army seized power and dethroned the egregious King Farouk. Out of these events Colonel Nasser eventually emerged as head of a reawakened Egypt and claimant to the leadership of the whole Arab world. In the Egypt of those days a desperately poor and ignorant peasantry was ruled by a cosmopolitan elite headed by a corrupt monarch. Army officers seethed with resentment against the British, who had long dominated in the Middle East and especially Suez. The Egyptian humiliation in the 1948 Palestine war eventually produced the coup against Farouk.
The army rulers wanted a revived Egypt, nucleus of a rejuvenated Arab world that would revenge itself against the oppressive Westerners and their Israeli tools. Domestic reforms would be the prelude. Many great estates were broken up and divided among landless peasants, labor unions were organized by the government. Symmetrically, the Communist party was badly mauled and driven underground. Islam and Egyptian nationalism were the fonts of the regime. Officers declared their adherence to the ageless principles of the Koran; patriots were urged to join the single party run by the army, which was by nature "removed from the conflict between classes," as Nasser' Nkrumah's grandiose plans faced grave internal opposition. Intellectuals of the coastal cities preferred continued rule by Britain to rule by Nkrumah and begged London not to hand over power to him. The intellectuals themselves were not much of a threat, but they could provide ideology and strategy to a much more important opposition group. These were the tribalists, strongest in the central (Ashanti) areas of Ghana, bitterly opposed to Nkrumah and his modernization schemes, and determined to break apart the new country into its ethnic elements. Many acts of violence against members of Nkrumah's Convention People's party (CPP) occurred in Ashanti, and after these had been put down with vigor, Nkrumah himself became the object of assassination attempts. Nkrumah's weapons against what he saw as the destructive disloyalty of the professors and the chiefs were the party and the parliament. The CPP sought to enroll in its ranks all men and women "of good will," despite ethnic or class diversity. In 1958 parliament passed the Preventive Detention Act, enabling Nkrumah to imprison anyone suspected of planning a treasonable act. The latter brought much foreign criticism but effectively curbed domestic violence.
In a celebrated passage in his autobiography Nkrumah lists among those whose writings influenced him the name of Mussolini.. Aside from an ideology common in essentials, both had a taste for vast public works projects and for outward legality. Between 1922 and 1940 only a relative handful of Italians lost their lives for political crimes; under Nkrumah there were no political executions whatever. Both men, personally indifferent to wealth, permitted and even encouraged corruption among subordinates. This pervasive graft eventually produced profound cynicism in both countries, reducing the later CPP, like the Italian Fascist party before it, to a shadow of the original. Thus, when each dictator was faced at last with military revolt, few citizens raised a voice, let alone a sword, iddefense of the regime. Like Mussolini's, the fall of Nkrumah was swift, unexpected, and uncontested. Like Mussolini, Nkrumah sought succor from an admiring dictator in another country. Like Mussolini, Nkrumah became after his fall the scapegoat for all the ills and shortcomings of his people.
Mussolini, Nasser, Peron, Nkrumah: "Fascism in a non-European context is not new. Goulart (1961 -64) . Nothing revealed the inadequacies of the inexperienced Goulart more than his connection with efforts to spread disaffection in the lower ranks of the armed forces. Out he went. The army had learned a lesson from the events after 1945; this time there would be no return of "civilian demagogues." The tradition belief in the army was that it had the right to intervene in politics. By 1964 civilian incompetence had convinced the army that it also had the ability to rule the country directly. Brazil must be cleaned up, the army could and would do the job. Thus Vargas-style fascism was replaced by military fascism.
As Alfred Stepan notes in The Military in Politics (I97 I), the new rulers interpreted national security in terms with which we are all now familiar: "rationally maximizing the output of the economy and minimizing all sources of cleavage and disunity within the country. Consequently great stress was put on the need for strong government and planning." Authoritarian, Clitist, and nationalist by definition, the Brazilian military dictatorship has sought legitimacy by providing economic growth through political stability. Undeniable strides have been taken: Since 1964 Brazil's annual growth rate has been among the world's highest. The military is gambling that economic abundance will alleviate the need for and memory of repression. Whether or not this gamble succeeds, commentators of the next century may well observe that the period from the late 1960's to the early 1980's laid the foundations for Brazil's emergence as a world power. Meanwhile a serious maldistribution of wealth, and certain of the methods employed in pursuit of stability, have called forth pointed criticisms (and more) from such diverse entities as the Vatican and the White House. Not unpredictably the Brazilian Government has reacted to such outside interference with signal irritability. Some political scientists would object to including Brazil in the fascist category because there are still competitive elections and it lacks a "charismatic leader." As to the first, these contests take place between carefully vetted and tame parties that take care not to offend the military rulers. If, nevertheless, there would be some unfortunate slip-up, the army can; and does, annul the election. It's all very neat.
As for the absence of charismatic leadership, this stems from deliberate decisions by top army leaders in 1964-65 to deemphasize personality in the interest of corporate military unity. Lack of such a leader may have handicapped the regime somewhat, but this fact alone hardly disqualifies it from inclusion in the ranks of fascism. In this particular as in others the Brazilian set-up resembles that of prewar Japan.
Besides, nobody said that Third World fascisms are carbon copies of Mussolini's, only that they reproduce attitudes and forms typical of classical fascism: the urgent duty of an enlightened Clite, above petty class or regional loyalties, to cast aside ineffective traditional or democratic institutions to mobilize the country's resources in the face of internal and external threats to national integrity. s A.J. Gregor of the University of Califor-A nia has written in The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics (1974) : "Fascism [in Italy] was the first systematic and radical attempt to resolve the problems of status-deprived nations in the twentieth century." Now "national status-deprivation" is another way of saying "woundedamour-propre." If the group I belong to is despised, I am despised, and this is intolerable. Causes of status-deprivation in the Third World are not hard to find: the humiliation of being part of somebody else's colonial empire; the erosion of traditional sources of status; the prevalence of secessionism and all manner of disorder; a poverty, a squalor, that surpasses human understanding. Not that fascism is about economics; rather, poverty is an affront to national pride. Economic life must be accelerated in order that the nation may assert itself, demand respect, a place in the sun ("productionism"). Fascism is about politics. The inability to grasp the essentially political character of fascism explains why the more mechanistic Marxist accounts of fascism have been so wrong for so long.
Because status-deprivation is so typical of underdeveloped countries, and because fascist responses to it are so easy to grasp and seem so sensible, fascism finds a heterogeneous audience, from the university lecture hall and the officers' mess to the grimiest slum and dustiest village. This relationship between status-deprivation and fascism is clear in the three cases discussed above: the Egyptian army routed by infant Israel; the Ghanaians having their obscure destinies decided in London; the Brazilians forever debarred by incompetent and provincial politicians from the great-power status their numbers and resources entitle them to. But this relationship helps explain fascist-type responses in other contexts, typically with the army, a militarized Clite, playing the role of the fascist party:
.In-Libya, where Colonel Qaddafi provides the world's best example of how injured pride turns into fanatical and destructive nationalism. Mussolini was a student of Sorel, with his concept of the Great Myth as an instrument of mobilizing energies and loyalties. First of all, the prospects for American relations with these fascist states are somber. Their nationalist supersensensitivity will certainly impede the creation of anything like a more rational world economic order. Besides, Peronist Argentina once sought to challenge U.S.
hegemony in South America, and Brazil may soon do likewise. As Mussolini's. government quickly established relations with Lenin's, so from the RibbentropMolotov Pact to Nasser and Nkrumah, the superpatriots and the superracists have always been able to find a sympathetic ear at the Kremlin.
Contemplation of these patterns in Third World politics reminds us of Bertrand Russell's observation that "equal cooperation is so much more difficult than despotism, and so much less in line with instinct" (f ower, 1938). Democratic government demands much-compromise, patience, the suspicion that one is not infallible, the ability to find fulfillment in private and personal channels-and authoritarian, elitist, collectivist solutions like fascism often seem more congruent with the experiences of most peoples, much more "natural."
These gloomy reflections should lend no support to any silly racist delusions about the civic superiority of Caucasians. One would be hard pressed to find peoples who have more ferociously mangled their opportunities. for liberty than the Latins, the Teutons, and the Slavs. On the contrary, the growth of Third World fascisms reminds us of the continuity of the human experience, of the limits of human choice and imagination, and that citizens of those parts are not as exotic as we might fear (or prefer). Indeed, for those who still believe in popular self-government, the most resounding triumph in decades took place last year in, of all places, Indiaoverpopulated, underfed, ignorant, pitied, scorned, and incorrigibly determined to live in liberty, another thunderous and delightful refutation of the rigid Newtonian pretensions of a certain type of "social science."
But however heartening these Indian events, they do seem to stand in contradiction to a general trend. Democracy is a rare and tenuous plant. Those of us who live where it still survives may want to take better care of this endangered species.
